It is sound law that refusal to make rationalclassification where grossly dis-similar subjects are treated by the law violates the mandate of Article 14. Refusal to classify is one thing and it bears on constitutionality, not launching on micro-classification to work out perfect justice is left to executive expediency and legislative judgment and not for forensic wisdom.
In K.T. Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala (1961) 3 SCR 77 = (AIR 1961 SC 552) Sinha, C.J., emphasized that
Article 14 may be violated even though the law may, on the face, be equal if in substance unequal things are treated equally.
In State of Kerala v. Haji K. Haji Kutty Naha, Civil Appeal Nos. 1052 etc. of 1968 judgment dated 13-8-1969 = (reported in AIR 1969 SC 378), Shah J., observed :
Where objects, persons or transactions essentially dis-similar are treated by the imposition of a uniform tax, discrimination may result, for, in our view, refusal to make a rational classification may itself in some cases operate as denial of equality.”
A similar view has been taken in Khandige Sham Bhat v. The Agricultural Income Tax Officer, (1963) 3 SCR 809, 817 = AIR 1963 SC 591.
In Amalgamated Tea Estates Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (1974) 4 SCC 415, the Supreme Court has held :
8. It may be pointed out that the Indian Income Tax Act also makes a distinction between a domestic company and a foreign company. But that circumstance per se would not help the State of Kerala. The impugned legislation, in order to get the green light from Article 14, should satisfy the classification test evolved by this Court in a catena of cases. According to that test : (1) the classification should be based on an intelligible differentia and (2) the differentia should bear a rational relation to the purpose of the legislation.
9.The classification test is, however, not inflexible and doctrinaire. It gives due regard to the complex necessities and intricate problems of government. Thus as revenue is the first necessity of the State and as taxes are raised for various purposes and by an adjustment of diverse elements, the Court grants to the State greater choice of classification in the field of taxation than in other spheres. According to Subba Rao, J.:
“(T)he courts in view of the inherent complexity of fiscal adjustment of diverse elements, permit a larger discretion to the Legislature in the matter of classification, so long as it adheres to the fundamental principles underlying the said doctrine. The power of the Legislature to classify is of wide range and flexibility so that it can adjust its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways.” (Khandige Sham Bhat v. Agricultural Income Tax Officer, Kasargod; V. Venugopala Ravi Verma Rajah v. Union of India.)
10.Again, on a challenge to a statute on the ground of Article 14, the Court would generally raise a presumption in favour of its constitutionality. Consequently, one who challenges the statute bears the burden of establishing that the statute is clearly violative of Article 14. “The presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there is a clear transgression of the constitutional principle.” (See Charanjit Lal v. Union of India.)
In Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (1975) 2 SCC 175, the Supreme Court has observed :
“25.It is well-established that Article 14 forbids class legislation but does not forbid classification. Permissible classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. In permissible classification mathematical nicety and perfect equality are not required. Similarity, not identity of treatment, is enough. If there is equality and uniformity within each group, the law will not be condemned as discriminative, though due to some fortuitous circumstances arising out of a peculiar situation some included in a class get an advantage over others, so long as they are not singled out for special treatment. Taxation law is not an exception to this doctrine. But, in the application of the principles, the courts, in view of the inherent complexity of fiscal adjustment of diverse elements, permit a larger discretion to the Legislature in the matter of classification so long as it adheres to the fundamental principles underlying the said doctrine. The power of the Legislature to classify is of wide range and flexibility so that it can adjust its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways (see Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Khandige Sham Bhat v. Agricultural Income Tax Officer, Kasaragod) Keeping the above principles in view, we find no violation of Article 14 in treating pending cases as a class different from decided cases. It cannot be disputed that so far as the pending cases covered by clause (i) are concerned, they have been all treated alike.”
In Jain Bros v. Union of India, (1969) 3 SCC 311, the issue before this Court was whether the clause (g) of Section 297(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution in as much as in the matter of imposition of penalty, it discriminated between two sets of assessees with reference to a particular date, namely, those whose assessment had been completed before 1st day of April 1962 and others whose assessment was completed on or after that date. Whilst upholding the validity of the above provision, this Court has observed :
“Now the Act of 1961 came into force on first April 1962. It repealed the prior Act of 1922. Whenever a prior enactment is repealed and new provisions are enacted the Legislature invariably lays down under which enactment pending proceedings shall be continued and concluded. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, deals with the effect of repeal of an enactment and its provisions apply unless a different intention appears in the statute. It is for the Legislature to decide from which date a particular law should come into operation. It is not disputed that no reason has been suggested why pending proceedings cannot be treated by the Legislature as a class for the purpose of Article 14. The date first April, 1962, which has been selected by the Legislature for the purpose of clauses (f) and (g) of Section 297(2) cannot be characterised as arbitrary or fanciful.”
In Murthy Match Works v. CCE, (1974) 4 SCC 428 = 1978 (2) E.L.T. (J429) (S.C.),the Supreme Court has observed :
“15. Certain principles which bear upon classification may be mentioned here. It is true that a State may classify persons and objects for the purpose of legislation and pass laws for the purpose of obtaining revenue or other objects. Every differentiation is not a discrimination. But classification can be sustained only it it is founded on pertinent and real differences as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. The constitutional standard by which the sufficiency of the differentia which form a valid basis for classification may be measured, has been repeatedly stated by the Courts. If it rests on a difference which bears a fair and just relation to the object for which it is proposed, it is constitutional. To put it differently, the means must have nexus with the ends. Even so, a large latitude is allowed to the State for classification upon a reasonable basis and what is reasonable is a question of practical details and a variety of factors which the Court will be reluctant and perhaps ill-equipped to investigate. In this imperfect world perfection even in grouping is an ambition hardly ever accomplished. In this context, we have to remember the relationship between the legislative and judicial departments of Government in the determination of the validity of classification. Of course, in the last analysis Courts possess the power to pronounce on the constitutionality of the acts of the other branches whether a classification is based upon substantial differences or is arbitrary, fanciful and consequently illegal. At the same time, the question of classification is primarily for legislative judgment and ordinarily does not become a judicial question. A power to classify being extremely broad and based on diverse considerations of executive pragmatism, the Judicature cannot rush in where even the Legislature warily treads. All these operational restraints on judicial power must weigh more emphatically where the subject is taxation.
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19.It is well-established that the modern state, in exercising its sovereign power of taxation, has to deal with complex factors relating to the objects to be taxed, the quantum to be levied, the conditions subject to which the levy has to be made, the social and economic policies which the tax is designed to subserve, and what not. In the famous words of Holmes, J. in Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson2 :
We must remember that the machinery of Government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints.”
In R.K. Garg v. Union of India, (1981) 4 SCC 675, the Supreme Court has held :
Now while considering the constitutional validity of a statute said to be violative of Article 14, it is necessary to bear in mind certain well established principles which have been evolved by the courts as rules of guidance in discharge of its constitutional function of judicial review. The first rule is that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a statute and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles. This rule is based on the assumption, judicially recognised and accepted, that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and its discrimination are based on adequate grounds. The presumption of constitutionality is indeed so strong that in order to sustain it, the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation.
8.Another rule of equal importance is that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion etc. It has been said by no less a person than Holmes, J., that the legislature should be allowed some play in the joints, because it has to deal with complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or strait-jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters, where, having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the legislature. The court should feel more inclined to give judicial deference to legislative judgment in the field of economic regulation than in other areas where fundamental human rights are involved.”
In Elel Hotels and Investments Ltd. v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 698, the Supreme Court has held :
20.It is now well settled that a very wide latitude is available to the legislature in the matter of classification of objects, persons and things for purposes of taxation. It must need to be so, having regard to the complexities involved in the formulation of a taxation policy. Taxation is not now a mere source of raising money to defray expenses of Government. It is a recognised fiscal tool to achieve fiscal and social objectives. The differentia of classification presupposes and proceeds on the premise that it distinguishes and keeps apart as a distinct class hotels with higher economic status reflected in one of the indicia of such economic superiority.”
In P.M. Ashwathanarayana Setty v. State of Karnataka, (1989) Supp. (1) SCC 696, the Supreme Court has held :
“… the State enjoys the widest latitude where measures of economic regulation are concerned. These measures for fiscal and economic regulation involve an evaluation of diverse and quite often conflicting economic criteria and adjustment and balancing of various conflicting social and economic values and interests. It is for the State to decide what economic and social policy it should pursue and what discriminations advance those social and economic policies.”
38.In Kerala Hotel and Restaurant Assn. v. State of Kerala, (1990) 2 SCC 502, this Court has observed :
The scope for classification permitted in taxation is “24. greater and unless the classification made can be termed to be palpably arbitrary, it must be left to the legislative wisdom to choose the yardstick for classification, in the background of the fiscal policy of the State….”
In Spences Hotel (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B., (1991) 2 SCC 154,the Supreme Court has observed :
26.What then ‘equal protection of laws’ means as applied to taxation? Equal protection cannot be said to be denied by a statute which operates alike on all persons and property similarly situated, or by proceedings for the assessment and collection of taxes which follows the course usually pursued in the State. It prohibits any person or class of persons from being singled out as special subject for discrimination and hostile legislation; but it does not require equal rates of taxation on different classes of property, nor does it prohibit unequal taxation so long as the inequality is not based upon arbitrary classification. Taxation will not be discriminatory if, within the sphere of its operation, it affects alike all persons similarly situated. It, however, does not prohibit special legislation, or legislation that is limited either in the objects to which it is directed, or by the territory within which it is to operate. In the words of Cooley : It merely requires that all persons subjected to such legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The rule of equality requires no more than that the same means and methods be applied impartially to all the constituents of each class, so that the law shall operate equally and uniformly upon all persons in similar circumstances. Nor does this requirement preclude the classification of property, trades, profession and events for taxation — subjecting one kind to one rate of taxation, and another to a different rate. “The rule of equality of taxation is not intended to prevent a State from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. It may, if it chooses, exempt certain classes of property from any taxation at all, may impose different specific taxes upon different trades and professions.” “It cannot be said that it is intended to compel the State to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation.” In the words of Cooley : 21
“Absolute equality is impossible. Inequality of taxes means substantial differences. Practical equality is constitutional equality. There is no imperative requirement that taxation shall be absolutely equal. If there were, the operations of government must come to a stop, from the absolute impossibility of fulfilling it. The most casual attention to the nature and operation of taxes will put this beyond question. No single tax can be apportioned so as to be exactly just and any combination of taxes is likely in individual cases to increase instead of diminish the inequality.”
“Perfect equality in taxation has been said time and again, to be impossible and unattainable. Approximation to it is all that can be had. Under any system of taxation, however, wisely and carefully framed, a disproportionate share of the public burdens would be thrown on certain kinds of property, because they are visible and tangible, while others are of a nature to elude vigilance. It is only where statutes are passed which impose taxes on false and unjust principle, or operate to produce gross inequality, so that they cannot be deemed in any just sense proportional in their effect on those who are to bear the public charges that courts can interpose and arrest the course of legislation by declaring such enactments void.” “Perfectly equal taxation”, it has been said, “will remain an unattainable good as long as laws and government and man are imperfect.” ‘Perfect uniformity and perfect equality of taxation’, in all the aspects in which the human mind can view it, is a baseless dream.”
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