The Delhi High Court, in the case of Abhijit Mishra v. Wipro Limited, Civil Suit (OS) Number 31 of 2021, decided on 14.07.2025, addressed the extent to which employers can exercise their contractual termination rights without violating an employee’s right to reputation.
The Court held that while the Defendant was entitled to terminate the employment as per the determinable contract, the inclusion of stigmatic and unsubstantiated remarks such as “malicious conduct” and “complete loss of trust and confidence” amounted to actionable defamation. The Court found that these statements were demonstrably false and not supported by any evidence or disciplinary record, contrasting sharply with the plaintiff’s positive performance appraisals and internal feedback.
The judgment draws a critical distinction between a lawful termination under a determinable contract and impermissible use of stigmatic, unsubstantiated remarks.
FACTS
Mr. Abhijit Mishra (hereinafter referred to as “the Plaintiff”), was employed as a Principal Consultant at Wipro Limited (hereinafter referred to as “the Defendant”) from 14.03.2018 to 05.06.2020. His employment contract contained Clause 10, which permitted either party to terminate the contract without assigning reasons, subject to a one-month notice period during probation and a two-month notice period after confirmation.
On 05.06.2020, the Defendant invoked Clause 10 to terminate the Plaintiff’s employment. However, the termination letter additionally stated that the Plaintiff’s behavior amounted to “malicious conduct” and that there had been a “complete loss of trust and confidence.”
Aggrieved by these allegations, the Plaintiff filed a civil suit seeking damages.
ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT
- Whether the termination violated the employment contract?
- Whether the statements in the termination letter amounted to defamation?
- If termination was wrongful, was the Plaintiff entitled to damages?
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
The Plaintiff contended that the imputations in the termination letter, especially about “malicious conduct” and “complete loss of trust”, were utterly false, stigmatic, and not supported by even an iota of evidence. The Plaintiff further contended that no inquiry, warning, or performance record warranted such serious allegations and that these unsubstantiated imputations had caused severe damage to his professional reputation and employability. Given that the right to reputation forms a fundamental element of Article 21 of the Constitution, the Plaintiff argued that the Defendant’s communication was defamatory in nature and injurious to dignity. The Plaintiff thus prayed for damages and a fresh termination letter, deleting the defamatory content.
The Defendant, on the contrary, contended that the termination had been effected strictly in terms of Clause 10 of the employment contract, which entitled either party to terminate without assigning reasons. The Defendant maintained that the words used in the letter were internal evaluations based on the Plaintiff’s acts, inefficiency, and insubordination, and were necessary to record the breakdown of the employer–employee relationship. The Defendant also contended that no claim for defamation could arise since the letter had been communicated only to the Plaintiff and had never been published to any third party. It was also contended that the Plaintiff himself was responsible for the deterioration of relations and had since gained entry into the legal practice, with him having suffered no real reputational or financial loss.
DECISION AND FINDINGS
The Delhi High Court began its analysis by examining the nature of the Plaintiff’s contract of employment, particularly Clause 10, which allowed either party to terminate the engagement without assigning reasons, subject only to the prescribed notice. It took the view that this clause made it a determinable contract within the meaning of Section 14(d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Court reaffirmed that private contracts of employment are not specifically enforceable and not amenable to public law scrutiny. The effect of an arbitrary or procedurally flawed dismissal is to grant a right to monetary compensation limited only to the notice period. Since the Defendant had paid the sum representing the notice pay, the Court concluded that the termination was not in breach of the employment contract. As a consequence, the issues of wrongful termination and consequential damages stand decided against the Plaintiff.
The Court took a sharply different view, however, in the case of the Plaintiff’s claim for defamation. Taking its cue from the basic components of civil defamation, false and defamatory statement, publication to a third party, clear identification, and lack of any valid defence, the Court deemed that the language in the termination letter crossed any permissible bounds of employers’ communications. By contrast, the remarks on “malicious conduct” and “complete loss of trust” were compared to the Plaintiff’s performance appraisals, leadership feedback, and internal evaluations the Court found absolutely nothing to support them. In fact, those records continuously described the Plaintiff as a good performer and a valuable contributor. There was no disciplinary proceeding, warning letter, or inquiry report filed, which further weakened the Defendant’s justification. In summary, the Court held that such statements were false, stigmatic, and defamatory, and the Defendant had not established any defence of truth, justification, fair comment, or privilege.
The Court explained that employers are aware that ex-employees are often compelled to disclose their letters of termination at the time of background verification or during the recruitment process, making that communication foreseeably available to third parties. Thus, even though the Defendant itself had not published the letter independently, such foreseeable and inevitable publication by the Plaintiff was good enough to satisfy the requirement of publication in civil defamation. The doctrinal import here is quite significant for the expansion of Indian tort law in employment contexts.
Having established all the necessary elements of defamation and finding no evidence in support from the Defendant, the Court proceeded with assessing damages. Considering that Indian courts typically do not award punitive damages in ordinary defamation cases, the Court awarded general compensatory damages. It thus granted INR 2,00,000 to the Plaintiff for emotional distress, loss of reputation, and vindication of the Plaintiff’s standing in society.
The second relief sought by him as to the issuance of a fresh letter of termination was not given, since it would practically amount to redrafting the employer’s letter, an interference too great. The judgment thus displays a balancing approach, besides reaffirming the contractual autonomy and limited enforceability of private employment relationships, the Court simultaneously echoes that an employer cannot use termination communications as a means to cast unproven aspersions on an employee’s character. False and unsupported allegations, even those contained within internal documents, can attract liability for defamation if reputational harm is foreseeable and unavoidable.
AMLEGALS REMARKS
The Delhi High Court’s decision in this case marked an essential correction to the way in which termination communications are regarded in private employment. While correctly reiterating that such contracts are determinable and not amenable to reinstatement, it sent out a strong message that employers cannot use contractual clauses to insert unverified or stigmatizing allegations into the relieving letters. Termination may be contractual, but defamation is not.
What is particularly significant is the adoption by the Court of the doctrine of compelled self-publication. In the modern world, employees are often required to send termination letters to prospective employers, which means any defamatory remark is inherently and foreseeably public. This broadens employer liability and fixes a clear duty of care in how termination communications are drafted.
In all, the decision strikes a balance in the employment relationship, wherein while employers remain entitled to dismiss without giving reasons, they must do so responsibly, factually, and in a manner that does not harm an employee’s reputation. The judgment serves as a timely reminder that dignity in the workplace extends beyond employment and into the very manner in which employment is terminated.
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