Introduction

Arrest powers under the indirect tax statutes carry a built-in safeguard: the senior officer who forms the opinion that a person should be arrested must first have “reasons to believe” and record them. The question that has troubled courts is whether the person to be arrested is entitled to see those reasons before the arrest, so that he can use them to seek anticipatory bail. The Supreme Court answered that question in Union of India v. Sunil Biyani ((2026) 45 Centax 207 (S.C.)) in the context of Section 69 of the CGST Act.

In Nikhil Aggarwal v. Union of India (Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 1114 of 2026, decided on 5-10-2026), reported as (2026) 47 Centax 363 (All.), the Allahabad High Court considered whether the same requirement governs an arrest under Section 26 of the Health Security se National Security Cess Act, 2025, and whether it applies to an arrest made before Sunil Biyani was decided.

The High Court ruled in the petitioners’ favour. It held that the judgments of a constitutional court operate retrospectively unless expressly made prospective, that Section 26 of the Cess Act is pari materia with the arrest provisions of the GST law, and that the recorded reasons to believe had to be furnished to the accused before the arrest. Placing those reasons before the Magistrate at the time of remand was held not to meet the requirement. The Court found a violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution, quashed the arrest and directed the release of the petitioners, if not wanted in any other case.

Background of the Case

The petitioner challenged his arrest by the Directorate General of GST Intelligence, Zonal Unit, Meerut (hereinafter “DGGI”) under the Health Security se National Security Cess Act, 2025 (hereinafter “the Cess Act”). The allegation was that the petitioner was involved in the unauthorised manufacture and operation of unregistered packaging machines for pan masala and chewing tobacco, carried out by M/s DNA Products and M/s Pan Samrat Group at premises in Village Hiranki, New Delhi, in contravention of the Cess Act.

On 16.07.2026, acting on a complaint, DGGI raided the two firms. Their proprietors, Jitender Kumar and Anil Kumar, are said to have disclosed that the petitioner was managing the affairs of both firms. On the same day, the residence of the petitioner’s father was searched from 7:00 PM to 2:20 AM and nothing was recovered. The petitioner’s own premises were searched from 8:20 PM on 16.07.2026 to 8:30 AM the next morning, and, according to the petitioners, the only item seized was a document relating to a loan of Rs. 3,00,000 said to have been given to Jitendra Kumar.

The arrest memo was digitally signed on 17.07.2026 and uploaded at 10:30 PM, whereas it recorded the arrest as having taken place at 11:12 PM the same day. The reasons to believe were never served on the petitioners. During the pendency of the habeas corpus petition, the District Court rejected the petitioners’ bail application.

Aggrieved by the arrest, the petitioners approached the Allahabad High Court by way of a habeas corpus writ petition.

Contentions of the Parties

The petitioners argued that Union of India v. Sunil Biyani leaves nothing to doubt: the “reasons to believe” of the officer who considers the arrest necessary must be disclosed to the accused even before the arrest, so that he can challenge them in his application for anticipatory bail.

The petitioners relied on the case of Sunil Biyani, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the power to authorise another officer to arrest must be exercised in the prescribed format and must be preceded by reasons to believe that refer to the material and evidence underlying the opinion. They further relied on the finding of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil Biyani where it was held that an order under Section 69 of the CGST Act is a sine qua non for seeking anticipatory bail, so it would be an anomaly to hold that it need not be communicated at all, further where it was held that communicating the reasons strengthens the accused’s right to challenge them.

The petitioners further submitted that, without disclosure of the reasons, the provision would have drastic consequences for the right to liberty and would violate Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. They also relied on Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India ((2025) 27 Centax 425 (S.C.)) and Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) ((2020) 5 SCC 1) on the right to seek anticipatory bail. In passing, they pointed to the arrest memo being digitally signed before the recorded time of arrest.

DGGI argued that Sunil Biyani could not apply because the petitioners were arrested before it was pronounced, and that judgments of the Supreme Court have only prospective application. It further submitted that Radhika Agarwal explained “reasons to believe” in the backdrop of the PMLA, the Customs Act and the CGST Act, but did not address the supply of reasons to the accused under the CGST Act.

DGGI also relied on the coordinate bench decision in Jai Kumar Aggarwal v. Directorate General of GST Intelligence (2026:AHC:32796-DB), which held that no provision mandates supply of the reasons to believe to the accused, and argued that judicial discipline required the Court to follow it or refer the matter to a larger bench. Finally, DGGI stated that the reasons had been placed before the Magistrate at the time of remand and that the petitioners’ bail application had been rejected by the District Court.

Issues:
  1. Whether the principles in Union of India v. Sunil Biyani apply to an arrest made before the judgment was pronounced, or only prospectively?
  2. Whether Section 26 of the Cess Act, being pari materia with the arrest provisions of the GST law, requires the recorded reasons to believe to be furnished to the accused before arrest to enable him to seek anticipatory bail?
  3. Whether the earlier coordinate bench view in Jai Kumar Aggarwal, that there is no mandate to supply the reasons to believe, continues to hold the field after Sunil Biyani?
  4. Whether placing the reasons to believe before the Magistrate at the time of remand satisfies the statutory and constitutional requirement?

Whether the arrest is liable to be quashed, and whether the rejection of bail by the District Court during the pendency of the petition affects the habeas corpus remedy?

The Court’s Reasoning

The Court first set out the scheme of Section 26 of the Cess Act. The proper officer, not below the rank of Commissioner, must have reasons to believe that the person has committed a specified offence. On being so satisfied, he may authorise another officer to arrest that person. The arresting officer forms no reasons of his own. He only executes the arrest and gives the accused the grounds of arrest. The Court described this as a two-officer framework.

On retrospectivity, the Court politely disagreed with DGGI. Every judgment of a constitutional court is retrospective unless the court expressly makes it prospective. Such a judgment does not legislate or lay down new law; it only enunciates the existing law by interpreting the statute, and so it applies to cases that arose before it was pronounced. Sunil Biyani therefore governed the petitioners’ arrest even though it was decided later.

On the argument that Radhika Agarwal was silent on the point, the Court held that Section 26 of the Cess Act is pari materia with the arrest provisions of the PMLA, the Customs Act and the CGST Act. As there was no categorical negative finding that the principle would not apply to the supply of reasons to believe to the accused under GST, it had to be extended to cases under the Cess Act.

On Jai Kumar Aggarwal, the Court noted that the coordinate bench had rejected the argument that the reasons must be furnished to the accused. That position, the Court held, stood changed entirely by Sunil Biyani, which came later and categorically held that the reasons to believe must be given to the accused to enable him to apply for anticipatory bail. In effect, the Supreme Court validated the argument made in Jai Kumar Aggarwal. Because only the authorising officer forms the reasons, it is those reasons that the accused needs in order to seek anticipatory bail.

The Court also dealt with three further points:

  • Remand is not a substitute: The reasons to believe had not been served on the petitioners till date, which DGGI did not dispute. Placing them before the Magistrate at remand does not satisfy the requirement. It is not for the Magistrate to validate the reasons at that stage; it is for the accused to use them in preparing his anticipatory bail application.
  • Bail rejection is irrelevant: The rejection of the petitioners’ bail application by the District Court during the pendency of the petition did not affect the petition, because the grounds for bail and the grounds for a habeas corpus petition under Article 226 are completely different.
  • Arrest memo: The Court noted that the memo was digitally signed and uploaded about 45 minutes before the recorded time of arrest, but it decided the matter on the non-supply of the reasons to believe.

The Court concluded that there was a complete violation of the law laid down in Sunil Biyani, and that this infringed the petitioners’ fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution.

The Decision

The Allahabad High Court, Division Bench, allowed the habeas corpus petition.

  • Held that the principles in Union of India v. Sunil Biyani apply retrospectively and govern the petitioners’ arrest, which took place before that judgment.
  • Held that Section 26 of the Cess Act, being pari materia with the GST arrest provisions, requires the recorded reasons to believe of the authorising officer to be furnished to the accused before arrest, to enable him to seek anticipatory bail.
  • Held that the position in Jai Kumar Aggarwal stood changed by Sunil Biyani, and that production of the reasons before the Magistrate at remand does not meet the statutory or constitutional requirement.
  • Declared the arrest to be violative of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution, and quashed and set aside the arrest.
  • Directed that the petitioners be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other case.
AMLEGALS REMARKS

This ruling reinforces the procedural safeguards that follow from the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Sunil Biyani. The Hon’ble Court treated the supply of the authorising officer’s recorded reasons as a precondition to a valid arrest, not a formality that can be cured at the remand stage. Its reasoning is not confined to the Cess Act. Because Section 26 was held to be pari materia with the arrest provisions of the CGST Act and other statutes, the same logic is likely to be invoked in challenges to arrests under Section 69 of the CGST Act

For any queries or feedback, feel free to connect with Dhwani.tandon@amlegals.com

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