It is now well settled that an Explanation added to a statutory provision is not a substantive provision in any sense of the term but as the plain meaning of the word itself shows it is merely meant to explain or clarify certain ambiguities which may have crept in the statutory provision. Sarathi in ‘Interpretation of Statutes’ while dwelling on the various aspect of an Explanation observes as follows:
“(a) The object of an explanation is to understand the Act in the light of the explanation.
(b) It does not ordinarily enlarge the scope of the original section which it explains, but only makes the meaning clear beyond dispute.”
Swarup in ‘Legislation and Interpretation’ very aptly sums up the scope and effect of an Explanation thus :
“Sometimes an explanation is appended to stress upon a particular thing which ordinarily would not appear clearly from the provisions of the section. The proper function of an explanation is to make plain or elucidate what is enacted in the substantive provision and not to add or subtract from it. Thus an explanation does not either restrict or extend the enacting part; it does not enlarge or narrow down the scope of the original section that it is supposed to explain………. The Explanation must be interpreted according to its own tenor; that it is meant to explain and not vice versa .”
Bindra in ‘Interpretation of Statutes’ (5th Edn.) at page 67 states thus :
“An explanation does not enlarge the scope of the original section that it is supposed to explain. It is axiomatic that an explanation only explains and does not expand or add to the scope of the original section…. The purpose of an explanation is, however, not to limit the scope of the main provision…. The construction of the explanation must depend upon its terms, and no theory of its purpose can be entertained unless it is to be inferred from the language used. An ‘explanation’ must be interpreted according to its own tenor.”
The principles laid down by the aforesaid authors are fully supported by various authorities of the Supreme Court. In Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer [(1961) 1 SCR 902 : (AIR 1961 SC 315)], a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court observed thus :
“Now, the Explanation must be interpreted according to its own tenor, and it is meant to explain cl. (1)(a) of the Article and not vice versa . It is an error to explain the Explanation with the aid of the Article, because this reverses their roles.”
In Bihar Co-operative Development Cane Marketing Union Ltd. v. Bank of Bihar (1967) 1 SCR 848 : (AIR 1967 SC 389), the Supreme Court observed thus :
“The Explanation must be read so as to harmonise with and clear up any ambiguity in the main section. It should not be so construed as to widen the ambit of the section.”
In Hiralal Rattanlal etc. v. State of U.P. [(AIR 1973 SC 1034)], the Supreme Court observed thus :
“On the basis, of the language of the Explanation this Court held that it did not widen the scope of clause (c). But from what has been said in the case, it is clear that if on a true reading of an Explanation it appears that it has widened the scope of the main section, effect be given to legislative intent notwithstanding the fact that the legislature named that provision as an Explanation. “
In Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 2 SCR 790: (AIR 1977 SC 915), the Supreme Court observed thus :
“It is true that the orthodox function of an explanation is to explain the meaning and effect of the main provision to which it is an explanation and to clear up any doubt or ambiguity in it………. Therefore, even though the provision in question has been called an Explanation, we must construe it according to its plain language and not on any a priori considerations.”
Thus, from a conspectus of the authorities referred to above, it is manifest that the object of an Explanation to a statutory provision is –
(a) to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself,
(b) where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the same so as to make it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to subserve,
(c) to provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it meaningful and purposeful,
(d) an Explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the enactment or any part thereof but where some gap is left which is relevant for the purpose of the Explanation, in order to suppress the mischief and advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the Court in interpreting the true purport and intendment of the enactment, and
(e) it cannot, however, take away a statutory right with which any person under a statute has been clothed or set at naught the working of an Act by becoming an hindrance in the interpretation of the same.
A deeming fiction is a supposition of law that the thing is true without inquiring whether it be so or not, that it may have the effect of truth so far as it is consistent with justice. A deeming provision is made to include what is obvious or what is uncertain or to impose, for the purpose of statute, an ordinary construction of a word or phrase that would not otherwise prevail but, in each case, it would be a separate question as to that what object the Legislature has made on such a deeming fiction.
The word deemed is used in various senses. Sometimes, it means generally regarded. At other time, it signifies ‘taken prima facie to be’, while in other case, it means, ‘taken conclusively’. Its various meanings are, – ‘to deem’ is ‘to hold in belief, estimation or opinion’; to judge; adjudge; decide; considered to be; to have or to be of an opinion; to esteem; to suppose, to think, decide or believe on considerations; to account, to regard; to adjudge or decide; to conclude upon consideration. (see Major Law Lexicon by P.Ramanatha Aiyar, 4th Edition 2010 Vol.2).